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Abstract
This paper reassesses the claim that electronic voting systems help voters to avoid 
common mistakes that lead to their votes remaining uncounted. While prior stud-
ies have come to mixed conclusions, I provide new, more robust evidence based 
on a case study of extended Internet voting trials in Geneva canton, Switzerland. 
The trials almost exclusively involved referendum votes. For causal identification I 
exploit the unique circumstance that federal safety legislation created a near-natural 
experiment, with some of the canton’s municipalities participating in the trials and 
others not. Using difference-in-differences estimation, I find that the residual vote 
rate decreased by an average of 0.3 percentage points if municipalities offered the 
possibility to vote online in addition to (mostly optically scanned) paper ballots. For 
cantonal measures, which are located towards the bottom of ballot papers in Geneva, 
the reduction increases to 0.5 percentage points. These remain relatively modest 
effects, and I find no evidence for a knock-on effect on electoral outcomes. However, 
on average only around 20% of votes were cast online where the opportunity existed, 
and online voting was most popular among voters with high levels of education. 
Despite the small effect sizes, the results of this study therefore point to the potential 
of Internet and, more generally, electronic voting technology to reduce avoidable 
voter mistakes.
Keywords Elections · Uncounted ballots · Residual votes · Electronic voting · 
Internet voting · Democratic legitimacy
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Introduction
Electoral turnout, and how to improve it, range among the core concerns in politi-
cal science. However, more frequently overlooked is the fact that even if citizens 
participate in elections, their votes do not always enter the final count. Compar-
ative evidence suggests that between 3 and 5% of votes cast remain uncounted 
(i.e., are ruled blank or invalid) in the average democratic election (Martinez i 
Coma and Werner 2019; Uggla 2008). In some contexts, such as Latin America, 
it is not uncommon for the number of uncounted votes to exceed 10% of votes 
cast (Power and Garand 2007).
Uncounted votes (henceforth also referred to as residual votes) can reflect the 
actual will of voters. Some voters choose to intentionally spoil their ballots as a 
form of protest. Others choose to skip some of the less salient races on a ballot 
(Solvak and Vassil 2015). However, residual votes often also result from mistakes 
on the side of voters. For example, uncertainty about electoral rules can lead vot-
ers to vote for more candidates than are allowed under the rules, leading to the 
invalidation of their votes (Carman et al. 2008). Moreover, voters may acciden-
tally skip races due to oversight, or they may fail to mark ballots in a sufficiently 
clear way. This paper considers the potential of Internet voting technology to 
reduce such accidental residual votes.
Accidental residual votes range among the lesser known challenges to demo-
cratic legitimacy and the quality of representation. Of course, intentional residual 
votes are problematic as well because they often reflect voter alienation. How-
ever, citizens who accidentally cast residual votes would have wanted to make 
their voices heard, but failed to do so. Therefore, accidental residual votes contra-
vene a central democratic principle: that the votes of citizens must be accurately 
interpreted and counted (Dahl 1989, ch. 8). What is more, accidental residual 
votes are unlikely to be randomly distributed across different populations of vot-
ers. Existing evidence suggests that voters with low educational attainment are 
more prone to errors that lead to their votes not being counted (Bullock and Hood 
2002; Fujiwara 2015; Sinclair and Alvarez 2004). Where education levels are 
correlated with race and ethnicity, such as in the U.S., that can mean that voter 
errors are disproportionately committed by members of ethnic minorities (Tomz 
and Van Houweling 2003). By implication, accidental residual votes are likely to 
reinforce well-known inequalities in representation stemming from unequal par-
ticipation. In closely fought contests, they may even affect electoral outcomes.
Various proposals have been made for how to reduce accidental residual votes, 
including better training of polling staff, improved ballot design, and voter edu-
cation campaigns (Herrnson et al. 2012; Herron and Sekhon 2003; Kimball and 
Kropf 2005; Niemi and Herrnson 2003). Another prominent proposal concerns 
error-preventing voting technologies, such as electronic voting systems (Alvarez 
and Hall 2008). Paper ballots remain the most common voting method in con-
temporary democracies, more than 400 years after their invention (Reynolds and 
Steenbergen 2006). But when equipped with a pen and piece of paper, there is 
often little standing in the way of voters making avoidable errors. While they have 
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grown controversial in recent years due to vulnerability to fraud, an advantage of 
electronic voting systems is that they can be programmed to prevent voters from 
making such mistakes. As a result, electronic voting should make it more likely 
that votes enter the final count and, thus, increase effective participation.
However, empirical studies of whether electronic voting technology lives up to 
this promise have come to mixed conclusions (e.g., Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005; 
Stewart 2006). This paper provides new, more robust evidence on the effect of elec-
tronic voting technology on residual votes. While prior studies focused on electronic 
voting machines located in polling stations, this study extends the focus to Internet 
voting, a novel form of electronic voting that is increasingly discussed and experi-
mented with around the globe (Alvarez et al. 2009). Specifically, I study the case of 
Geneva canton, Switzerland, where Internet voting (henceforth also referred to as 
i-voting or online voting) has been trialed on an extended basis from 2003 to 2005 
and from 2008 onward. A limitation of the Geneva case is that experimentation 
with i-voting has largely involved referendums while eschewing elections. However, 
within these constraints, Geneva canton holds valuable lessons because it enables 
the estimation of Internet voting’s effect on uncounted ballots with comparatively 
high internal validity. The i-voting roll-out in Geneva canton resembles a natural 
experiment because, since the very first trials, federal safety legislation has been in 
place that led to between-municipality variation in the availability of i-voting, with 
i-voting being offered in some but not other municipalities. In turn, this permits to 
hold constant many sources of confounding that could have afflicted prior studies, 
including jurisdiction-specific electoral laws and counting practices as well as vary-
ing electoral dynamics.
Using difference-in-differences estimation, I find that the residual vote rate 
decreased by an average of 0.3 percentage points if municipalities offered the pos-
sibility to vote online in addition to (mostly optically scanned) paper ballots.1 For 
cantonal (i.e., regional) measures, which in Geneva are located towards the bot-
tom of ballot papers, the effect increases to a minus of 0.5 percentage points. These 
remain relatively modest effects, and additional analyses suggest that the reduction 
in uncounted ballots did not have a knock-on effect on electoral outcomes. However, 
only around 20% of votes tended to be cast online where the opportunity existed. 
Online voters also tend to have above-average education and, as a group, could thus 
be less prone to voting errors. Despite the relatively small effect sizes, the results of 
this study therefore point to the potential of Internet and, more generally, electronic 
voting technology to reduce avoidable voter mistakes.
1 As is explained below, paper voters had no access to technology, such as precinct scanners, that could 
have helped them to spot errors.
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Prior Work
The fiasco of the 2000 U.S. presidential election raised public awareness in 
America and elsewhere that the choice of voting technology is more than a mere 
technicality. Palm Beach County, Florida, demonstrated to the world that punch 
card ballots—a form of voting whereby voters punch holes in voting cards with 
a ballot marking device—are highly vulnerable to human error. As became evi-
dent, voters often fail to punch the cards cleanly, leading to the infamous ‘hang-
ing chads’ that might have swayed the 2000 election to Bush (Brady et al. 2001). 
Awareness also grew about similar concerns with other common voting methods. 
For example, the optical scanners that are sometimes used for the counting of 
write-in ballots may not count a vote if the relevant boxes, bubbles, or arrows 
have not been marked in a sufficiently clear way (Kimball and Kropf 2005). More 
generally, voters may misunderstand the rules and, for example, vote for both a 
presidential and a vice presidential candidate in U.S. elections (Herron and Sek-
hon 2003).
In 2002, the U.S. government passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). As 
a result, billions of federal and state tax dollars were spent to update older voting 
technologies. Most election authorities opted for one of two technological innova-
tions: precinct scanners and direct-recording electronic voting machines (DREs). 
Both, but especially DREs, came with the promise of minimizing “lost votes” due 
to malfunctioning voting technology and voter mistakes. Precinct scanners allow 
voters to have their ballot papers checked at the polling station before the casting 
of their votes. The most advanced implementations report both overvotes (i.e., if 
voters vote for more candidates or options than are allowed under the rules) and 
undervotes (i.e., blank votes), thus giving voters a chance to discover and correct 
potential mistakes (Brady et  al. 2001; Kimball and Kropf 2008). However, vot-
ers often fail to pre-check their ballots (Hanmer et al. 2010). DREs, by contrast, 
automatize much of the error checking and prevention process. For example, 
many DREs do not just alert voters to overvotes, but prevent overvotes altogether. 
DREs also remove all problems related to unclear marking of the ballot because 
votes are cast by touching a screen or pressing a button. Similarly to precinct 
scanners, DREs can also be programmed to alert voters if they are about to skip a 
race (e.g., with a flashing light) (Alvarez and Hall 2008).
Have these technological fixes worked as intended? The election debacle in 
2000 led to a flurry of new research into the relationship between voting technol-
ogy and residual votes, much of it focused on the U.S. (for a review of this litera-
ture cf. Stewart 2011). However, aside from a general consensus that punch card 
systems often lead to much higher residual vote rates (e.g., Brady et  al. 2001; 
Knack and Kropf 2003; Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005; Kimball and Kropf 
2008; though also cf. Lott 2009), the findings from this literature have remained 
contradictory. To be sure, several studies report evidence that precinct scanners 
(e.g., Alvarez et  al. 2013; Kimball and Kropf 2008) and DREs (e.g., Stewart 
2006) tend to reduce residual vote rates, including (for the case of DREs) two 
studies conducted outside the U.S., one in Brazil (Fujiwara 2015) and the other 
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in the Netherlands (Allers and Kooreman 2009). Particularly promising, Tomz 
and Van Houweling (2003) reported evidence from two U.S. states, Louisiana and 
South Carolina, that DREs significantly reduce the gap between African Ameri-
can and white voters in terms of voided ballots. However, other studies point in 
different directions. In a comprehensive study of the U.S. experience that cov-
ers the whole nation and elections from 1988 to 2000, Ansolabehere and Stewart 
(2005) find that DREs often produce more residual votes than traditional paper-
based voting methods, such as hand-counted write-in ballots. Knack and Kropf 
(2003) come to a similar conclusion in their study of the 1996 U.S. presidential 
election, whereas Brady et  al. (2001) find that DREs performed comparably to, 
but did not outperform, most paper-based voting systems in the 2000 U.S. presi-
dential election (also cf. Lott 2009). Regarding precinct scanners, both Knack and 
Kropf (2003, fn. 21) and Tomz and Van Houweling (2003, p. 56) report no signif-
icant differences in residual votes when comparing them with centrally counted 
optical scanning systems that do not provide voters with the possibility to check 
their ballots.
These disparate findings can be partly reconciled when considering that pre-
cinct scanners and DREs are not all born the same. Not all versions of precinct 
scanners alert voters to undervotes, which could decrease their performance 
(Miller 2013). At the same time, especially older DREs tended to have usability 
issues, which could explain why some studies found few, if any, improvements 
over paper-based voting technologies (Stewart 2006). Kimball and Kropf (2008), 
for example, show evidence from the 2004 election in the U.S. that full-face 
DREs that display all ballots at once on sometimes massive screens can over-
whelm voters and make it more rather than less likely that they miss down-ballot 
contests. In addition, the performance of voting technologies is likely to differ 
depending on context factors, such as the complexity of electoral rules, the design 
of paper ballots, and levels of education.
However, many prior studies also suffer from limitations that render their con-
clusions uncertain (Stewart 2011). Especially earlier studies often relied on cross-
sectional variation in voting technology while accounting for potential confound-
ers by controlling for factors such as the size and average income of electoral 
districts (e.g., Kimball and Kropf 2008; Knack and Kropf 2003; Tomz and Van 
Houweling 2003). However, this risks confounding the effects of voting technol-
ogy with other differences across jurisdictions that are more difficult to measure, 
such as the sophistication of voters, election laws, or levels of voter disaffection. 
Other studies have relied on more sophisticated panel data designs (e.g., Ansola-
behere and Stewart 2005), which allow to control for cross-sectional differences 
via fixed effects estimation. However, a problem that remains is that these stud-
ies tend to make comparisons across different elections with potentially differ-
ent dynamics, such as presidential races or ballot measures in different states. 
This risks conflating the effects of voting technology with election-specific fac-
tors, such as the closeness of races or their perceived importance (cf. Keele and 
Minozzi 2013). Therefore, more (and better) evidence on the performance of dif-
ferent voting technologies is needed.
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Internet Voting and Residual Votes
This study sheds new light on the causal effect of electronic voting technology on 
residual votes based on a case study of Geneva canton. While prior studies have 
focused on DREs, this study extends the focus to a different form of electronic vot-
ing: Internet voting. From the perspective of residual votes, DREs and i-voting sys-
tems are not too different, as error-prevention mechanisms available in the context of 
DREs are often easily extendable to online voting. However, whereas DREs are for 
voting in polling stations, i-voting extends error-prevention mechanisms to remote 
voters. The remainder of this section provides a short overview of the i-voting tri-
als in Geneva canton, including a discussion of the ways in which Geneva’s i-voting 
solution could have reduced the residual vote rate.
Geneva’s Internet Voting Trials
Geneva canton ranges among the Internet voting pioneers. In 2002, the Swiss gov-
ernment decided to enable trials with online voting in selected cantons. Geneva took 
up the challenge, along with two other cantons (Neuchâtel and Zurich). In 2003, 
Geneva staged Switzerland’s first i-voting experiment in the context of a local-
level referendum in Anières, one of its smaller municipalities. The following year, 
Anières and three other municipalities first used i-voting for federal (i.e., national) 
and cantonal (i.e., regional) referendums. I-voting experiments continued in subse-
quent years in these and other municipalities. The only exception was the period 
between June 2005 and June 2008, when Geneva’s i-voting program was temporar-
ily suspended because of the need to establish a firmer legal basis. In 2009, online 
voting was extended to Swiss expatriates registered in Geneva canton, an option that 
has remained available to them since (Pammett and Goodman 2013; Serdült et al. 
2015).
Against initial expectations, Internet voting proved only moderately popular with 
Geneva’s voters. As in most other i-voting experiments (e.g., in Estonia), online bal-
lots were always offered as a complement to paper ballots in Geneva canton. How-
ever, more unusually, voters in Geneva always also had the option to vote by mail. 
Voting materials were always automatically sent to voters around 4 weeks prior to an 
electoral contest, and they could then choose whether to take their ballot papers to a 
polling station, whether to return them by mail, or, where that opportunity existed, 
whether to cast their votes online. Perhaps due to this highly convenient range of 
choices, on average only around 20% of votes were cast online where the opportu-
nity existed (Mendez and Serdült 2017; Serdült et al. 2015). The only major excep-
tion were expatriate voters, 50% and more of whom tended to make use of the possi-
bility to vote online (see Fig. 1 and, for further details, Germann and Serdült 2014).
Against the expectations of many, available evidence also suggests that the intro-
duction of i-voting had no effect on electoral turnout (Germann and Serdült 2017). 
Again, a plausible reason is the availability of postal voting. Voting in Geneva is 
rather convenient even in the absence of online ballots. Where voters cannot also 
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vote by mail, such as in Estonia or Canada, extant evidence suggests that online 
voting can provide a boost to turnout (Alvarez et  al. 2009 Goodman and Stokes, 
forthcoming).
Electronic Safeguards Against Accidental Residual Votes
However, even if i-voting did not affect participation rates in Geneva canton, by 
reducing voter errors it might still have increased the effective turnout in terms of the 
number of valid votes cast. Next, I identify the safeguards implemented in Geneva’s 
i-voting solution that could have helped voters to avoid accidental residual votes. 
Given that Geneva’s i-voting trials were generally limited to direct democratic votes, 
the discussion (as the empirical analysis that follows) focuses on the case of referen-
dum ballots.2
Throughout the period analyzed (2001–2016), the same referendum ballots fea-
turing ‘yes’ and ‘no’ boxes next to every measure were used in Geneva for both 
postal and the traditional ballot box voting. In order to cast a valid vote, voters had 
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Fig. 1  Internet voting usage in Geneva canton, 2004–2016. Data source: Serdült et al. (2015), updated 
with official records
2 For almost a decade Geneva offered i-voting exclusively in the context of referendums. In 2012, 
i-voting was first offered in the context of a cantonal election for Geneva’s Court of Auditors. However, 
i-voting remained unavailable in most subsequent elections. Therefore, the total number of elections con-
ducted online in Geneva canton remains too small for meaningful statistical analysis.
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to check one of these boxes with a cross. Mail ballots were then counted centrally 
with optical scanners, whereas votes cast in polling stations were counted by hand in 
the individual polling stations.3 As mail ballots were far more popular—often more 
than 90% or even 95% of paper ballots were returned by mail—most paper ballots 
were scanned. Neither mail nor precinct voters had access to any kind of technology, 
such as precinct scanners, that would allow them to check their marked ballots for 
errors.
Geneva’s i-voting system improves upon this system in two ways. First, it pre-
vents accidental overvotes. In the context of referendum votes, the danger that voters 
erroneously conclude that they are supposed to check both the yes and no boxes is 
likely to be small. However, it is possible that voters leave stray marks covering the 
second box, which can prevent the optical scanners from deciphering a voter’s inten-
tion, leading to the invalidation of the vote.4 Similarly, voters may come to realize 
that they did not give the answer they intended to give, leading them to check the 
second box while attempting to strike through (or erase) their original answer, which 
is not allowed. Geneva’s i-voting system prevents such unintentional overvotes 
because voters can choose their favored answer from a drop-down menu, which 
makes choices correctable and ensures that voters give one answer only.
Second, Geneva’s i-voting system is likely to reduce accidental undervotes. I-vot-
ing precludes undervotes that result from voters placing their checks outside of the 
relevant boxes. I-voting also precludes undervotes that result from voters using a 
red-colored pen, which cannot be read by Geneva’s optical scanners. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the i-voting software makes it less likely that voters skip 
a race by accident. It is not uncommon in Switzerland that voters have to vote on 5, 
10, or even more ballot measures at the same time (Selb 2008). When ballots are 
as crowded, the chance that voters unintentionally skip one or more of the propos-
als is likely to increase. While it is still possible to cast a blank vote with i-voting, 
it becomes less likely that voters do so unintentionally because online voters are 
shown a confirmation screen after completing their ballot. The confirmation screen 
prompts voters to review their choices before the final submission. Thus, undervot-
ing becomes more transparent and correctable.
Empirical Strategy
Could these safeguards reduce the residual vote rate? The Geneva case enables a 
comparatively robust answer to this question because of its staggered adoption of 
i-voting over time and space.
Ever since the very first i-voting trials in Geneva canton, federal safety legislation 
has been in place limiting the number of voters who can participate in i-voting trials. 
3 Between 2010 and 2012 the canton replaced the scanners used prior to this with a new, quicker model 
from the same company (Axiome). According to electoral administrators, the older and the new models 
had the same functionality, apart from speed.
4 Stray marks constitute less of a problem for the minority of paper ballots that are counted manually.
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The goal of this law has been to reduce the risk in terms of electoral manipulation. 
Initially, the safety legislation stipulated that not more than 20% of all voters in a 
canton should have access to online voting. In 2012, the cap was increased to 30% 
of a canton’s electorate.5 To conform with this legislation, Geneva’s electoral admin-
istrators decided to trial i-voting only in selected municipalities. This way, they 
could ensure that the federally imposed cap would never be surpassed. There was 
some turnover over time, with some municipalities dropping out of the trials and 
others joining. But i-voting was always offered in some municipalities and not oth-
ers. Notably, all voters in trial municipalities had the option of voting online. Trial 
municipalities were selected so that the federal cap would still be met if that were 
to happen. Of course, in practice only a minority of voters tended to make use of 
the possibility (see above), so that the actual number of online voters was consist-
ently far below the federal cap. Importantly, trial municipalities were not selected 
randomly, but election officials sought to balance trial and non-trial municipalities 
on key socio-demographics (Germann and Serdült 2017). Table  1 shows that this 
strategy was partially (but not fully) successful when it comes to population size, 
age, education levels, and per capita income.
Table 1  Descriptive statistics and balance
Trial municipalities are defined as municipalities that made i-voting available at least once during the 
period under study. All data is drawn from official statistics and refers to 2010, except for education 
(2000). Per capita income is given in constant 1993 Swiss francs. Expatriates are excluded because data 
is either unavailable or does not apply
Means Difference p-value
Trial municipalities 
( N = 22)
Non-trial municipali-
ties ( N = 23)
Population size 10401.59 9988 413.59 0.96
Age structure
 0–19 (%) 25.10 25.39 0.29 0.71
 20–34 (%) 17.63 16.68 0.95 0.27
 35–49 (%) 23.60 23.81 0.21 0.77
 50–64 (%) 18.32 19.38 1.06 0.06
 65+ 15.34 14.74 0.60 0.52
Education
 < secondary (%) 3.33 2.26 1.06 0.00
 Secondary (%) 65.67 63.39 2.28 0.28
 Tertiary (%) 31 34.35 3.35 0.14
Per capita income (CHF) 47,605.93 49,683.98 2078.05 0.71
5 Since 2014, federal legislation allows the extension of i-voting to 50% or even all voters in a canton if 
advanced security requirements are met, such as universal verifiability. However, at the time of writing 
Geneva’s i-voting system did not meet these requirements.
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However, even if trial and non-trial municipalities are not fully balanced, the sig-
nificant upshot of the way in which Geneva responded to the federal safety legisla-
tion is that there is both over-time and between-municipality variation in the avail-
ability of i-voting. As a result, municipalities from the same political unit, some of 
which had i-voting whereas others did not, can be compared while they simultane-
ously voted on the same issues. This set-up facilitates difference-in-differences esti-
mation and, therefore, to straightforwardly account for any cross-sectional imbal-
ances between trial and non-trial municipalities, such as, at least approximately, 
differences in income or education. Moreover, difference-in-differences estimation 
automatically takes care of any confounder that is specific to voting days or even 
ballot proposals, such as varying levels of voter disaffection or interest in referen-
dum proposals. Beyond this, electoral laws apply uniformly across Geneva canton, 
thus ruling out bias due to variation in electoral legislation; and causal inference is 
facilitated further by Geneva’s relatively high social homogeneity (Geneva is com-
monly referred to as a “city canton” and 80% of its municipalities are counted as 
urban or peri-urban by the Federal Statistics Office).
Overall, the case set-up in combination with difference-in-differences estimation 
make it possible to rule out most possible confounders by design. However, differ-
ence-in-differences estimates are valid only if the parallel trends assumption is met 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009). In the present case, this means that under the counter-
factual scenario where i-voting would have never been introduced, the residual vote 
rate should have evolved in parallel in treated (with i-voting) and control (without 
i-voting) municipalities. Further below I provide indirect evidence in favor of the 
parallel trends assumption. At the same time, I relax the parallel trends assump-
tion via the inclusion of municipality-level time trends. Municipality-level time 
trends can increase our confidence that smooth changes in, for example, the socio-
economic composition of municipalities do not bias the causal estimates. Moreo-
ver, all models control for electoral participation. While existing evidence suggests 
that i-voting had no measurable effect on turnout in Geneva canton (Germann and 
Serdült 2017), controlling for participation ensures that the estimated effects are 
independent of any small changes in turnout rates that cannot be safely distinguished 
from zero. In the robustness section I show that controlling for additional time-vary-
ing confounders does not affect the results.
Four further remarks are in order before turning to the empirical analysis. First, 
prior to 2001 Geneva canton used a different paper voting system whereby voters 
had to write ‘yes’ or ‘no’ next to referendum proposals rather than checking boxes. 
Also, prior to 2001 all ballots were counted manually, including mail ballots. There-
fore, all analyses reported below focus on the period from 2001 onward.
Second, in late 2016 Geneva switched to a system whereby voters from all 
municipalities can i-vote if they register for an online ballot. To comply with fed-
eral safety regulations, registrations are capped at 30% of the canton’s electorate. 
Unfortunately, this implies that there is no longer between-municipality variation in 
i-voting availability. Given the absence of suitable control units, the analysis stops in 
September 2016, after which the new system was introduced.
Third, the federal safety regulation applies only to federal votes. Therefore, 
Geneva was in principle free to offer i-voting on a broader basis for its own, 
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canton-level electoral contests. However, in practice cantonal referendums tend to be 
scheduled simultaneously with federal referendums, to profit from the latter’s higher 
turnout and save costs. As it would be impractical to offer i-voting for some but 
not other votes on the same ballot, the 20/30% cap therefore implicitly also applied 
to most cantonal referendums. There were only three exceptions to this general 
rule during the period studied. In May 2011, November 2011, and October 2012, 
no simultaneous federal referendums were scheduled and Geneva canton therefore 
allowed all its citizens to vote online in cantonal referendums. Given the lack of 
within-canton variation, there are no plausible counterfactuals in these cases. There-
fore, I exclude all 11 cantonal referendums voted on these three dates. All other can-
tonal referendums are included.
Finally, as there are no plausible counterfactuals for municipal contests, I exclude 
all municipal referendums, even if they were voted simultaneously with federal 
referendums.
Main Results
I proceed to estimate the causal effect of the availability of i-voting in a municipality 
on the number of residual votes. The sample covers all cantonal and federal refer-
endums voted in Geneva canton between 2001 and September 2016, except for the 
aforementioned 11 cantonal referendums when i-voting was made available in all 
municipalities. Overall, the sample includes 284 referendums voted on 53 separate 
dates. The unit of analysis is a municipality voting on a referendum proposal. All 45 
municipalities in Geneva canton are included. In addition, I include expatriate voters 
as a separate, artificial 46th municipality. The results remain similar when expatriate 
voters are dropped (see Table S1 in the Online Supplement).
The dependent variable is the residual vote rate, defined as the percentage of 
votes that do not enter the final count relative to the total number of votes cast.6 The 
average residual vote rate in the sample is 5.3%.7 The central explanatory variable is 
the availability of i-voting in a municipality. I-voting was available on 28 of the 53 
voting days (156 of 284 referendums) in at least four and a maximum of 18 munici-
palities during the period studied (see Fig. 2 for breakdowns by municipality).
All estimates are based on OLS regression with municipality and referendum 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by municipality to account for time 
6 Geneva’s electoral statistics do not clearly separate under- from overvotes. While undervotes always 
figure as ‘blank’, overvotes can figure as both ‘blank’ or ‘invalid’, depending on the circumstances (cf. 
articles 64 and 65A of Geneva’s ‘loi sur l’exercice des droits politiques (LEDP) [law on the exercise of 
political rights]’). Unfortunately, this makes it impossible to determine the extent to which the aggregate 
effects reported below are due to reductions in over- and undervotes, respectively.
7 Note that this figure includes a considerable number of intentional undervotes. According to post-refer-
endum surveys (Kriesi et al. 2018), on average around 3% of Swiss voters intentionally cast a blank vote 
on a ballot proposal during the period under study. The most likely reason is lack of interest in some of 
the less salient proposals on a ballot. Usually less than 0.5% of Swiss voters reported to have cast a blank 
vote on each and every proposal on the ballot. The corresponding figures for Geneva canton cannot be 
established due to sample restrictions.
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dependence. Two-way fixed effects regression constitutes a generalization of dif-
ference-in-differences estimation for multiple time periods (Angrist and Pischke 
2009,  pp. 233–241). The causal effect of the availability of i-voting is estimated 
0
1
3-6
16-22
23-28
Expatriates: 23
0
8
21-41
82-117
124-156
Expatriates: 121
# of voting days # of referendums
Fig. 2  Availability of i-voting in Geneva canton, 2004–2016
Table 2  Difference-in-difference 
estimates of the effect of 
i-voting on the residual vote rate
The table shows coefficients from OLS regressions including munic-
ipality and referendum fixed effects as well as quadratic municipal-
ity-level time trends. All models control for electoral turnout. Stand-
ard errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses and 
p-values in square brackets
Model (1) (2) (3)
All  
referendums
Federal  
referendums
Cantonal 
referendums
I-voting − 0.32 − 0.25 − 0.46
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
[0.00] [0.04] [0.00]
Control for elec-
toral participation
✓ ✓ ✓
Municipalities 46 46 46
Voting days 53 49 44
Referendums 284 138 146
Observations 13,064 6348 6716
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solely based on within-municipality variation in the availability of i-voting and the 
residual vote rate. All models include quadratic municipality-level time trends and 
control for electoral participation.8
The results suggest that Internet voting constitutes an effective method to reduce 
voter errors and uncounted ballots. As argued above, Geneva’s i-voting solution 
prevents overvotes and decreases the potential for unintentional undervotes (among 
other things because of the confirmation screen). Model 1 in Table 2 suggests that 
as a result of this, the residual vote rate decreased by an average of 0.32 percentage 
points if a municipality offered the possibility to vote online ( p < 0.001 ). To get a 
better grasp of the magnitude of this effect, I compare the point estimate to the coun-
terfactual numbers of residual votes had i-voting never been made available. This 
suggests that i-voting decreased the average residual vote rate from 5.4 to 5.1% in 
municipalities with i-voting, which corresponds to a 6% decrease. Expressed differ-
ently, i-voting increased the share of valid votes in an average referendum by 0.3%, 
from 94.6 to 94.9%. While not earth-shattering, an 0.3% increase in the number of 
valid votes—and, therefore, effective turnout—is notable in light of the fact that 
only around a fifth of voters tended to make use of online voting where that pos-
sibility existed. Also, survey evidence suggests that Geneva’s online voters tended to 
have comparatively high levels of education. In particular, online voters were almost 
twice as likely to have a university degree compared to paper voters (Sciarini et al. 
2013, p. 48). Therefore, Geneva’s online voters constitute a demographic that, a pri-
ori, should be less susceptible to voter errors.9
Additional analyses reported in models 2 and 3 in Table 2 suggest that electronic 
safeguards against residual votes are especially important when it comes to can-
tonal (and, thus, down-ballot) measures. Specifically, I find that whereas i-voting 
decreased the residual vote rate by a mere quarter of a percentage point in federal 
referendums ( p = 0.04 ), the reduction amounts to almost half a percentage point in 
cantonal referendums ( p < 0.001 ). The most plausible explanation for this finding is 
the extra nudge to voters provided by the confirmation screen to review their choices 
before the final submission. Cantonal referendums may be more prone to oversight 
and accidental undervotes, first, because they are often seen as ‘second order’ and 
tend to receive less media attention (Buetzer 2011), and second, because they are 
placed towards the bottom of ballot papers.10 Therefore, asking voters to confirm 
their choices may be more important when it comes to cantonal referendums.
8 The results remain almost identical when dropping turnout from the list of controls (see Table S2 in 
the Online Supplement).
9 Internet voters in Geneva also tended to be younger than the average voter (Sciarini et al. 2013, p. 29; 
Serdült et al. 2015), but age is a less likely determinant of accidental residual votes.
10 Conforming with these arguments, cantonal referendums have a higher residual vote rate compared 
to federal referendums (3.6% versus 6.9%). However, note that voters are also more likely to selectively 
abstain from cantonal referendums due to lack of interest or higher information costs.
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Causal Identification Assumption and Robustness Checks
The central causal identification assumption is that the residual vote rate would 
have evolved in parallel in municipalities with and without Internet voting had 
Internet voting never been introduced. To assess the plausibility of the parallel 
trends assumption, I consider the evolution of the residual vote rate in the period 
before the first i-voting trial in September 2004. Figure  3 shows annual aver-
ages of the number of residual votes from 2001 to mid-2004 by treatment status. 
Municipalities with at least one i-voting trial in subsequent years are assigned to 
the treatment group. All others are assigned to the control group. As becomes evi-
dent, the residual vote rate follows a very similar trajectory in treated and control 
municipalities before the first i-voting trial. This is of course no direct test of the 
parallel trends assumption, which relates to a counterfactual and is therefore fun-
damentally untestable. However, evidence for parallel pre-treatment trends makes 
it plausible that the residual vote rate would have developed in parallel also after 
September 2004 had i-voting never been introduced, and hence that the reduction 
in residual votes attributed to i-voting has causal interpretation.
I provide additional, statistically-based evidence for the parallelism of pre-
treatment trends based on a placebo test. To this purpose, I define a placebo treat-
ment and code it 1 for all referendums voted on the 3 voting days before the first 
i-voting trial in a municipality, where applicable. I then estimate an analogous 
two-way fixed effects models including both the indicator for actual i-voting 
availability and the placebo treatment. As would be expected if pre-treatment 
Fig. 3  Pre-treatment trends (residual vote rate)
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trends are parallel, model 1 in Table 3 shows that the placebo treatment has no 
statistically significant effect on the residual vote rate ( p = 0.20).
To further probe the internal validity of the results, I re-estimate the model while 
accounting for several additional municipality-level covariates that could plausibly 
affect the number of residual votes: per capita income, unemployment rate, popula-
tion size (logged), age group shares (20–34; 35–49; 50–65; and 65+), the share of 
non-Swiss nationals, and vote shares for left-wing parties in the previous national 
election (lower chamber).11 All data is drawn from official statistics. Data on the 
average income in municipalities is available only until and including 2015, so all 
referendums voted in 2016 are now dropped. Moreover, expatriate voters are no 
longer included because data on several covariates are unavailable (e.g., unem-
ployment rate) or do not apply (e.g., share of foreigners). Further improving con-
fidence in the estimated effect, model 2 in Table  3 shows that the coefficient for 
i-voting remains almost identical in both size (− 0.32) and statistical significance 
( p = 0.002 ). Similar conclusions are reached for this as well as all other robustness 
checks when disaggregating the sample into federal and cantonal referendums (see 
Tables S3 and S4 in the Online Supplement).
Table 3  Robustness checks
The table shows coefficients from OLS regressions including municipality and referendum fixed effects 
as well as quadratic municipality-level time trends. All models control for electoral turnout. Standard 
errors clustered by municipality (and, in model 4, by municipality and voting day) are shown in paren-
theses and p-values in square brackets. All models include both cantonal and federal referendums
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
I-voting − 0.28 − 0.32 − 0.34 − 0.32
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Placebo treatment 0.16
(0.13)
[0.20]
Control for electoral participation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Additional covariates ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
No simultaneous municipal contests ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Two-way clustered standard errors ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Municipalities 46 45 46 46
Voting days 53 50 53 53
Referendums 284 256 284 284
Observations 13,064 11,520 12,903 13,064
11 Unfortunately, municipal-level data on education levels is unavailable beyond the year 2000 due to 
a change in census data collection practices. However, the control for per capita income should at least 
partly make up for this. It is also worth noting that per capita income is far from statistically significant 
(p = 0.38).
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Next, I re-estimate the treatment effect while dropping cases with simultaneous 
municipal elections or referendums (see model 3 in Table 3). Simultaneous munici-
pal electoral contests are rare—less than 1.5% of observations are concerned—and 
most municipal electoral contests are low-key affairs, similarly to cantonal refer-
endums. Still, some municipal contests may mobilize additional voters, leading to 
potential violations of the parallel trends assumption. Reassuringly, the effect of 
i-voting on the residual vote rate remains virtually unchanged when dropping obser-
vations with simultaneous municipal contests.
Finally, I re-estimate the treatment effect while clustering standard errors by 
municipality and voting day. This adjusts standard errors for contemporane-
ous dependence among referendums voted on the same day, in addition to time 
dependence (Cameron et al. 2011). I find that the variance estimate remains similar 
( p = 0.005 ) (see model 4 in Table 3), including when estimating separate models for 
cantonal ( p = 0.001 ) and federal ( p = 0.08 ) referendums (see Tables S3 and S4 in 
the Online Supplement).
Indirect Effect on Electoral Outcomes?
Having established the robustness of the causal estimate, I finally turn to the ques-
tion whether the reduction in the residual vote rate affected the outcomes of ref-
erendums in Geneva canton. As noted in the introduction, prior evidence suggests 
that voting errors are disproportionately committed by voters with low educational 
attainment (Bullock and Hood 2002; Tomz and Van Houweling 2003). Therefore, 
an important hope associated with error-reducing voting technologies has been 
that they reduce education-based disparities in uncounted ballots and can thereby 
improve the representation of less educated voters (Knack and Kropf 2003; Tomz 
and Van Houweling 2003). In line with this, Fujiwara (2015) found evidence that 
the introduction of DREs in Brazil increased electoral support for policy propos-
als that directly benefit voters with low education, such as economic redistribution 
and a strong welfare state, as well as support for left-wing parties more generally. 
However, whether such findings generalize to the case of Internet voting is not clear, 
especially as online voting is less frequently used by voters with low levels of educa-
tion (Serdült et al. 2015).
To investigate potential knock-on effects on electoral outcomes I repeat the esti-
mation set-up from above while switching the dependent variable from the residual 
vote rate to direct-democratic policy choices made by Geneva’s voters. As above, 
all models control for electoral turnout so as to make sure that the measured effect 
of the availability of i-voting reflects the implications of the reduction in uncounted 
ballots.12 Table 4 shows the results.
I consider a total of four dependent variables. The first two enable me to inves-
tigate whether the reduction in uncounted ballots shifted referendum outcomes 
12 However, the results are again similar in models that do not control for turnout (see Table S6 in the 
Online Supplement).
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systematically to the left (or right). These measures leverage the fact that parties in 
Switzerland almost always publish voting recommendations prior to referendums. 
Using this information I coded two variables that, respectively, record the share of 
valid votes cast in favor of the options recommended by the Socialists (the larg-
est left-wing party in Geneva canton) and the Greens (the second-largest left-wing 
party). For example, the first variable records the vote share in favor of a proposal 
if the Socialists recommended a ‘yes’ vote, and the no share if the Socialists rec-
ommended a ‘no’ vote. Models 1 and 2 in Table  4 show that the introduction of 
i-voting, conditional on turnout, had no statistically significant effect on levels of 
voter support for policy proposals favored by left-wing parties ( p = 0.45 and 0.92, 
respectively). This suggests that the reduction in residual votes did not pull electoral 
outcomes towards the left (or the right).
Next, I analyze whether i-voting more specifically affected voter support for 
economic redistribution. To test this I manually identified referendums with direct 
implications for the level of economic redistribution from richer to poorer citizens. 
I was able to identify 66 relevant referendums.13 I then used these 66 ballot propos-
als to code a variable recording the share of valid votes for increased redistribution. 
The variable corresponds to the yes share if a proposal would increase redistribution 
(e.g., a 2014 proposal for a federal minimum wage) and the no share for propos-
als that would lower redistribution (e.g., a 2002 proposal to cut unemployment ben-
efits). Again, I find no evidence for an indirect effect on referendum outcomes (see 
model 3 in Table 4).
Table 4  Who benefits? The (lack of a) systematic effect on referendum outcomes
The table shows coefficients from OLS regressions including municipality and referendum fixed effects 
as well as quadratic municipality-level time trends. All models control for electoral turnout. Standard 
errors clustered by municipality are shown in parentheses and p-values in square brackets. All models 
include both cantonal and federal referendums. Refer to the Online Supplement for results from disag-
gregated models
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent  
variable
Support  
socialists
Support  
greens
Support  
redistribution
Support cultural 
conservatism
I-voting 0.21 0.05 − 0.15 − 0.23
(0.27) (0.48) (0.50) (0.60)
[0.45] [0.92] [0.76] [0.70]
Control for electoral 
participation
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipalities 46 46 46 46
Voting days 53 53 35 28
Referendums 275 264 66 38
Observations 12,650 12,144 3036 1748
13 Table  S12 in the Online Supplement lists all referendums used to measure ‘support redistribution’, 
including short descriptions of the policy proposals.
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As elsewhere in Western Europe, the working class in Switzerland has increas-
ingly turned to right-populist parties advocating culturally conservative policy pro-
posals (Oesch 2012). As a final step, I therefore consider whether i-voting affected 
support for nativist policy proposals, such as a 2014 proposal to cut “mass immi-
gration”, as well as other proposals generally associated with the cultural conserva-
tism to cultural liberalism continuum, such as European integration, law and order, 
gay rights, and abortion (cf. Kriesi et al. 2006). I found a total of 38 relevant refer-
endums during the period studied, and coded an analogous variable recording the 
share of valid votes in favor of cultural conservatism.14 This variable records the yes 
share if a proposal would lead to more cultural conservatism (e.g., the previously 
mentioned proposal to cut immigration) and the no share if a proposal would lead to 
less cultural conservatism (e.g., a 2005 proposal to grant foreigners the right to vote 
Fig. 4  Pre-treatment trends (referendum outcomes)
14 Table S13 in the Online Supplement lists all referendums used to measure ‘support cultural conserva-
tism’.
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in municipal elections). Again, I find no evidence that the reduction in residual votes 
affected referendum outcomes (see model 4 in Table 4).
Figure  4 plots average vote shares for left-wing parties as well as support for 
economic redistribution and cultural conservatism prior to the first i-voting trial. 
It becomes visible that the different dependent variables evolved approximately in 
parallel in treated and control municipalities.15 All four models also pass placebo 
treatment checks (see Table S7 in the Online Supplement).16 Analogously to above, 
this can be seen as supporting the parallel trends assumption and, hence, that the 
effect estimates have causal interpretation. Tables S8 and S9 in the Online Supple-
ment show that the results remain unchanged when controlling for additional time-
varying covariates and when dropping observations with simultaneous municipal 
contests. Finally, I also find no effects on electoral outcomes when disaggregating 
the sample into cantonal and federal referendums (see Tables S10 and S11 in the 
Online Supplement). This rules out an indirect effect that is visible only for cantonal 
referendums, which tend to see larger reductions in the residual vote rate.
Overall, these results suggest that i-voting’s reduced error potential remained 
without systematic implications for the outcomes of referendums and, in particular, 
that the introduction of i-voting did not improve the policy representation of voters 
with low education. As noted, a possible explanation is that online voting is most 
popular with highly educated voters, which could offset any effect on the represen-
tation of less educated voters. For such an effect to materialize, more voters with 
low education may have to make use of the opportunity to vote online. That said, 
it is important to note that the estimated coefficients represent average effects. One 
cannot, therefore, infer that the reduced error rate did not affect the outcome of any 
given referendum.
Conclusion
Uncounted ballots rarely make headlines. But the number of votes that are discarded 
from the tallying of final results can run into the tens of thousands and, in large 
polities, the hundreds of thousands. This study presented new evidence that Inter-
net voting systems can prevent voters from accidentally casting residual votes. The 
estimated effects—an 0.25 percentage points reduction in the residual vote rate for 
federal referendums and almost 0.5 percentage points for cantonal referendums—
may seem modest and some prior studies, if often based on less robust research 
designs, reported larger effects for similar comparisons. Stewart (2006), for exam-
ple, presented evidence that U.S. counties that switched from central count opti-
cal scan systems to DREs after the 2000 election reported an 0.7 percentage points 
reduction in the residual vote rate in the 2004 presidential election. Extending the 
15 As above, municipalities are considered ‘treated’ if its citizens had the opportunity to i-vote at least 
once after September 2004, and as ‘control’ if citizens never could i-vote.
16 As above, the placebo treatments are coded 1 for the 3 voting days before the first i-voting trial in a 
municipality.
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focus to referendum ballots, Kimball and Kropf (2008) report a similar effect size 
for touch-screen DREs.17 However, the estimates from these studies refer to situa-
tions in which most, if not all, voters made use of electronic voting. By contrast, the 
estimates from this study refer to a situation in which only a fifth of votes were cast 
electronically (i.e., online), and the rest by paper.
Therefore, despite the relatively small effect sizes, this research suggests that 
electronic voting systems provide an effective remedy against common mistakes 
made by voters. What is more, this study also points to a way how error-reducing 
voting technology can be extended to remote voters. Countries around the globe 
increasingly allow voters to cast their votes remotely, most typically by mail 
(Gronke et al. 2008). However, only voters who frequent a polling station can profit 
from error-reducing technologies considered in prior studies, including DREs and 
precinct scanners (Alvarez et al. 2013). A unique benefit of Internet voting is that it 
allows the extension of technological safeguards against accidental residual votes to 
remote voters.
Nevertheless, the results of this study cannot, and should not, be read as a blan-
ket recommendation of Internet voting (or electronic voting more generally). One 
of Internet voting’s weak points is that it tends to appeal more strongly to more 
educated (and younger) citizens. While that may change in the future (Vassil et al. 
2016), all voters should be able to profit from safeguards against errors. If a polity 
wants to enable remote voting, that could, for example, suggest a combination of 
Internet voting with DREs. However, proneness to accidental residual votes is not 
the only criterion by which voting technologies should be judged. There are, in par-
ticular, increasingly concerns about the vulnerability of electronic voting systems to 
third party manipulation and consequent risks to the integrity of elections. As deci-
sions on voting technology should not be based on their proneness to residual votes 
alone, no clear recommendations can follow from studies of residual votes, such as 
this one.
At the same time, this remains a single case study. Case constraints prevented me 
from analyzing residual votes in elections. Most paper votes in Geneva canton are 
also counted with optical scanners while in other contexts paper ballots are hand-
counted. Based on a priori reasoning, there seem to be few reasons why the results 
of this study should not generalize to elections and to manual counting. Many kinds 
of elections have decidedly more complex rules than yes/no referendums and, there-
fore, more potential for voter error. And, while some of the issues that can emerge 
with optical scanners, such as stray marks, may be less of a problem if ballots are 
hand-counted, paper ballots remain difficult to correct; and irrespective of the count-
ing method cannot alert voters to undervotes or prevent overvoting. Nevertheless, 
to move beyond conjecturing, more empirical evidence from other case contexts is 
needed.
17 However, the latter effect does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Also, it is 
worth reiterating that other studies reported evidence that DREs lead to more, rather than fewer, residual 
votes when compared to central count optical scan systems (e.g., Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005; Knack 
and Kropf 2003).
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Beyond cross-validation, an important contribution of future studies could be 
to identify the most effective technological safeguards against residual votes. For 
example, Geneva’s online voting system prompts voters to review their choices via 
the inclusion of a confirmation screen. Could accidental residual votes be reduced 
more effectively if voters were in addition given explicit reminders that they are 
about to undervote? And what if they were shown contests sequentially rather than 
all on the same screen, as is the case in Geneva canton? Finally, we also need more 
comparative evidence on the performance of electronic voting systems relative to 
other measures against accidental residual voting. For example, are electronic vot-
ing systems or precinct scanners more effective in reducing residual votes? Or, are 
improvements in paper ballot design or voter education campaigns more effective 
responses? While the existing literature has few answers to these questions, provid-
ing them will prove useful to electoral administrators around the world.
Acknowledgements Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ECPR General Conference at the 
University of Wroclaw (2019), the Three Countries Congress at ETH Zurich (2019), the Elections, Public 
Opinion, and Parties Conference at Royal Holloway, University of London (2018), and a seminar at the 
University of Bath (2018). I am especially grateful to John Curtice, Anja Giudici, Kostas Gemenis, Silke 
Goubin, Sophia Hatzisavvidou, Fernando Mendez, Penny Miles, Uwe Serdült, Rodney Smith, Jennifer 
Thomson, Katerina Vrablikova, Jonathan Wheatley, and four anonymous reviewers for valuable com-
ments and criticisms. A big thank you also goes to the Chancellerie d’État of the canton of Geneva for 
their patient answers to my repeated queries regarding the voting process in Geneva canton.
Data Availability The data and code required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the 
journal’s Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network (https ://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/01F70 K)
Compliance with Ethical Standards 
Conflicts of interest The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen 
ses/by/4.0/.
References
Allers, M. A., & Kooreman, P. (2009). More evidence of the effects of voting technology on election out-
comes. Public Choice, 139(1–2), 159–170.
Alvarez, R. M., Beckett, D., & Stewart, C. (2013). Voting technology, vote-by-mail, and residual votes in 
California, 1990–2010. Political Research Quarterly, 66(3), 658–670.
Alvarez, R. M., & Hall, T. E. (2008). Electronic elections. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Alvarez, R. M., Hall, T. E., & Trechsel, A. H. (2009). Internet voting in comparative perspective: The 
case of Estonia. Political Science & Politics, 42(3), 497–505.
 Political Behavior
1 3
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J. S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ansolabehere, S., & Stewart, C. (2005). Residual votes attributable to technology. Journal of Politics, 
67(2), 365–389.
Brady, H. E., Buchler, J., Jarvis, M., & McNulty, J. E. (2001). Counting all the votes: The performance of 
voting technology in the United States. Berkeley, CA: University of California.
Buetzer, M. (2011). Second-order direct democracy in Switzerland: How sub-national experiences differ 
from national ballots. In T. Schiller (Ed.), Local direct democracy in Europe (pp. 138–156). Wies-
baden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Bullock, C. S., & Hood, M. V. (2002). One person-no vote; one vote; two votes: Voting methods, ballot 
types, and undervote frequency in the 2000 presidential election. Social Science Quarterly, 83(4), 
981–993.
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2011). Robust inference with multiway clustering. Jour-
nal of Business & Economic Statistics, 29(2), 238–249.
Carman, C., Mitchell, J., & Johns, R. (2008). The unfortunate natural experiment in ballot design: The 
Scottish parliamentary elections of 2007. Electoral Studies, 27(3), 442–459.
Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
Fujiwara, T. (2015). Voting technology, political responsiveness, and infant health: Evidence from Brazil. 
Econometrica, 83(2), 423–464.
Germann, M., & Serdült, U. (2014). Internet voting for expatriates: The Swiss case. eJournal of eDemoc-
racy & Open Government, 6(2), 197–215.
Germann, M., & Serdült, U. (2017). Internet voting and turnout: Evidence from Switzerland. Electoral 
Studies, 47, 1–12.
Goodman, N. J., Stokes, L. C. (forthcoming). Reducing the cost of voting: An empirical evaluation of 
Internet voting’s effect on local elections. British Journal of Political Science.
Gronke, P., Galanes-Rosenbaum, E., Miller, P. A., & Toffey, D. (2008). Convenience voting. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 11, 437–455.
Hanmer, M. J., Park, W. H., Traugott, M. W., Niemi, R. G., Herrnson, P. S., Bederson, B. B., et al. (2010). 
Losing fewer votes. Political Research Quarterly, 63(1), 129–142.
Herrnson, P. S., Hanmer, M. J., & Niemi, R. G. (2012). The impact of ballot type on voter errors. Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science, 56(3), 716–730.
Herron, M. C., & Sekhon, J. S. (2003). Overvoting and representation: An examination of overvoted 
presidential ballots in Broward and Miami-Dade counties. Electoral Studies, 22(1), 21–47.
Keele, L., & Minozzi, W. (2013). How much Is Winnesota like Wisconsin? Assumptions and counterfac-
tuals in causal inference with observational data. Political Analysis, 21(2), 193–216.
Kimball, D. C., & Kropf, M. (2005). Ballot design and unrecorded votes on paper-based ballots. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 69(4), 508–529.
Kimball, D. C., & Kropf, M. (2008). Voting technology, ballot measures, and residual votes. American 
Politics Research, 36(4), 479–509.
Knack, S., & Kropf, M. (2003). Voided ballots in the 1996 presidential election: A county-level analysis. 
Journal of Politics, 65(3), 881–897.
Kriesi, H., Brunner, M., & Lorétan, F. (2018). VoxIt: Standardized post-vote surveys. Lausanne: 
FORSbase.
Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and the 
transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. European Journal 
of Political Research, 45(6), 921–956.
Lott, J. R. (2009). Non-voted ballots, the cost of voting, and race. Public Choice, 138(1–2), 171–197.
Martinez i Coma, F., & Werner, A. (2019). Compulsory voting and ethnic diversity increase invalid vot-
ing while corruption does not: An analysis of 417 parliamentary elections in 73 countries. Democ-
ratization, 26(2), 288–308.
Mendez, F., & Serdült, U. (2017). What drives fidelity to Internet voting? Evidence from the roll-out of 
Internet voting in Switzerland. Government Information Quarterly, 34(3), 511–523.
Miller, M. G. (2013). Do audible alerts reduce undervotes? Evidence from Illinois. Election Law Jour-
nal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, 12(2), 162–178.
Niemi, R. G., & Herrnson, P. S. (2003). Beyond the butterfly: The complexity of U.S. ballots. Perspec-
tives on Politics, 1(2), 317–326.
1 3
Political Behavior 
Oesch, D. (2012). The class basis of the cleavage between the new left and the radical right: An analysis 
for Austria, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland. Class politics and the radical right (pp. 31–51). 
London: Routledge.
Pammett, J. H., Goodman N. J. (2013). Consultation and evaluation practices in the implementation of 
Internet voting in Canada and Europe. Research study prepared for Elections Canada.
Power, T. J., & Garand, J. C. (2007). Determinants of invalid voting in Latin America. Electoral Studies, 
26(2), 432–444.
Reynolds, A., & Steenbergen, M. (2006). How the world votes: The political consequences of ballot 
design. Innovation and Manipulation, Electoral Studies, 25(3), 570–598.
Sciarini, P., Cappelletti, F., Goldberg, A., Nai, A., & Tawfik, A. (2013). Etude du vote par Internet dans 
le canton de Genève: Rapport final à l’intention de la Commission externe d’évaluation des poli-
tiques publiques. Geneva: University of Geneva.
Selb, P. (2008). Supersized votes: Ballot length, uncertainty, and choice in direct legislation elections. 
Public Choice, 135(3–4), 319–336.
Serdült, U., Germann, M., Harris, M., Mendez, F., & Portenier, A. (2015). Who are the Internet voters? 
In E. Tambouris, H. J. Scholl, M. Janssen, M. A. Wimmer, K. Tarabanis, M. Gascó, B. Klievink, I. 
Lindgren, M. Milano, P. Panagiotopoulos, T. A. Pardo, P. Parycek, & Ø. Sæbø (Eds.), Electronic 
government and electronic participation (pp. 27–41). Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Serdült, U., Germann, M., Mendez, F., Portenier, A., & Wellig, C. (2015). Fifteen years of Internet vot-
ing in Switzerland: History, governance and use. In L. Téran & A. Meier (Eds.), ICEDEG 2015 (pp. 
149–156). New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
Sinclair, D. E., & Alvarez, R. M. (2004). Who overvotes, who undervotes, using punchcards? Evidence 
from Los Angeles county. Political Research Quarterly, 57(1), 15–25.
Solvak, M., & Vassil, K. (2015). Indifference or indignation? Explaining purposive vote spoiling in elec-
tions. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 25(4), 463–481.
Stewart, C. (2006). Residual votes in the 2004 election. Election Law Journal, 5(2), 158–169.
Stewart, C. (2011). Voting technologies. Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 353–378.
Tomz, M., & Van Houweling, R. P. (2003). How does voting equipment affect the racial gap in voided 
ballots? American Journal of Political Science, 47(1), 46–60.
Uggla, F. (2008). Incompetence, alienation, or calculation? Explaining levels of invalid ballots and extra-
parliamentary votes. Comparative Political Studies, 41(8), 1141–1164.
Vassil, K., Solvak, M., Vinkel, P., Trechsel, A. H., & Alvarez, R. M. (2016). The diffusion of Internet vot-
ing. Usage patterns of Internet voting in Estonia between 2005 and 2015. Government Information 
Quarterly, 33(3), 453–459.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
